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Abstract. The idea-expression dichotomy was originally formulated to ensure that the 
manifestation of an idea is protected rather than the idea itself. Created with the intention of 
stimulating creativity while at the same time ensuring that such creativity is protected, this concept 
has come a long way since it was first formulated. However, in developing countries like India, this 
concept has not yet attained the levels of abstraction that is desirable and there has been little 
application of this concept in the Indian context. However this position can be expected to change 
and it is high time the Indian position on this concept is firmly established. 
1. Introduction 
 
The principle ‘the law must keep up with human development and progress’ is quite a clichéd one. But it can 
hardly be described thus, if one were to consider the growing relevance of software and technology in modern 
times. However on a practical scale, this evolution of the law is often fraught with difficulties given its reliance on 
principles and practices that have since time immemorial become its essence. So the question that we must 
consider here is how one needs to go about reconciling these governing standards of the law with the growing 
need for its evolution so that it is possible for one to encompass computer software protection into the law. It is in 
this context that this dichotomy between idea and expression has arisen.  Thus, if one seeks to understand the 
problems that we are facing with current copyright law and its application to computer software protection, one 
must first understand the nature of the afore-mentioned dichotomy between ideas and expression. The essential 
difference between the two has been classified as the foundation upon which copyright law rests.  
Courts have traditionally declined to put forth a straitjacket definition for the term idea. An idea has been 
described as a thought, as a mental image, as a conception of a theory. In layman terms, an idea can thus be 
described as a formulation of thought on a particular subject while expression would constitute implementing the 
said idea. Needless to state, the same idea can have numerous expressions and this is where the issue of copyright 
arises. If the same idea can be expressed in a number of different ways, a number of different copyrights may co-
exist and no infringement will result. However, one is faced with a problem when it becomes difficult to delineate 
between the idea and its expression. Herein lies the idea of merger where an idea and the expression cannot be 
separated and they are said to have merged. When merger has occurred, the expression may not be copyrighted, 
because to do so would in effect be copyrighting the idea.  However an oft quoted policy concern of this doctrine 
is that, when the idea and its expression are thus inseparable, protecting the expression in such circumstances 
would confer a monopoly of the idea upon the copyright owner. At the same time, an idea can also have certain 
expressions, without which the idea cannot exist. In other words, there can exist an idea where changing the 
expression of the same in a particular form would, in effect change the very idea itself.  Most courts consider these 
essential ideas not copyrightable, as to copyright them would also, in effect, copyright the idea. This type of 
merger is sometimes called scenes a faire. Another example of merger is when there are only a very few ways to 
express a given idea. This is called the ‘Idea-expression identity’ exception when specific instructions, even 
though previously copyrighted, are the only and essential means of accomplishing a given task, their later use by 
another will not amount to an infringement.1 Although the idea/expression dichotomy is such a time-honoured 
doctrine, it has long been subject to fierce criticisms for its failure to provide practical guidelines underneath its 
metaphysical surface. The intricacy lies in the fact that very few, if any, works contain exclusively either ideas or 
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expressions. Indeed, almost any work can be abstracted into a spectrum of various levels of generality, at one 
extreme of which is the principal goal or theme of the work and the other extreme is the literary expression. 
 
2.  The Law in the United States of America 
 
2.1 Origins 
 
American copyright literature has usually traced the origin of this dichotomy between idea and expression back to 
the seminal case of Baker v. Selden. 2 In this case, the plaintiff owned copyright in a series of books that explained 
a bookkeeping system annexed with certain forms consisting of ruled lines and headings, illustrating this system. 
The defendant was accused of copyright infringement, because it made and used account books arranged on 
substantially the same system, employing forms with slightly different columns and headings. In ruling in favour 
of the defendant, the Supreme Court held that there is a clear distinction between the books, as such, and the art, 
which they intended to illustrate. The description of the art in a book (the expression in the instant case), though 
entitled to the benefit of copyright, lays no foundation for an exclusive claim to the art (the idea) itself. 3 
 
2.2 Principles of the idea/expression dichotomy in Computer Software under U.S Law: - 
 
The afore-mentioned principle that governs the idea-expression dichotomy in the United States has since been 
incorporated into the software field as well. Copyright grants the author of a computer program the exclusive right 
to reproduce copies, prepare derivative works, distribute copies, and perform and display the copyrighted work for 
the period of his life plus fifty years.4 These exclusive rights are limited in several important ways however. The 
purchaser of a copy of a copyrighted computer program may make an archival copy of the program or adapt the 
program to his own specific needs, if he does so solely for his own use. In addition, the computer program may be 
used for teaching, research, or scholarship without constituting infringement under the fair use doctrine. As a final 
limitation, the statutory scheme embodies the common-law limitation that ideas as such are not protected. The Act 
gives a statutory definition of the idea/expression dichotomy:  
 
“In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, 
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless 
of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.”5 
 
In spite of such a provision this dichotomy has remained unsolved. Through an analysis of case law it 
becomes apparent that the purpose of this statutory definition is merely to restate, in the context of the new single 
Federal system of copyright, that the basic dichotomy between expression and idea remains unchanged. Thus, the 
resolution of the most crucial and most elusive question concerning the scope of copyright protection afforded to 
all works of authorship is solely a matter of judicial discretion. 
In the 1980s the National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU), 
created by the Congress to study the application of intellectual property law to computer software, came out with a 
final report that set forth four goals for copyright in computer programs, which reflect the traditional attempt to 
balance protection and competition: 
 
1. Copyright should proscribe the unauthorized copying of these works. 
2. Copyright should in no way inhibit the rightful use of these works. 
3. Copyright should not block the development and dissemination of these works. 
4. Copyright should not grant anyone more economic power than is necessary to achieve the incentive to 
create. 6 
 
Although accosted with severe criticism, this explicit recognition of computer programs as literary works 
under the Act settled the initial question of protection ability, but left the courts to resolve the scope of protection 
under the Act. In their attempts to be practical, however, courts have erected a framework that protects the time, 
effort, and money involved in the production of copyrighted material to the exclusion of all else. Thus it is helpful 
to examine how the courts have filled in the present outline of copyright protection of computer programs. 
Decisional and statutory laws make it abundantly clear that computer programs expressed in source code can be 
protected as literary works.7 Courts further have held that computer programs expressed in a higher-level language 
meet the statutory requirements of originality and fixation. The afore-mentioned defence that limited copyright to 
works designed to be read by lay individuals rather than by machines or experts, 8 was rejected by Courts in a line 
of cases, the most notable being Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp. which stated that copyright 
protection could also be extended to the object code version of a computer program embedded in a ROM. The 
afore-mentioned decisions are representative of the Court’s efforts to protect the object code of the software within 
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the definition of a ‘literary work’ under the Copyrights Act, 1976. This is because the mechanical process of 
coding from source code to object code has been held to be a product of sufficient mental labour to merit 
protection, the imprinting of which constitutes ‘fixation’. 
Similarly the 3rd Circuit Court rejected a claim by the infringers that sought to differentiate ‘operating 
systems’ from other computer programs, holding that such a distinction could not be made within the statutory 
definition of a ‘computer program’ as operating systems were also responsible for facilitating a computer’s 
interaction with an application apart from managing its internal functions. Thus the instructions that constituted the 
operating program were held to be subject to copyright.  
In so far as the application of copyright laws to software, more specifically, computer programs, is 
concerned, American courts have traditionally distinguished between idea and expression with reference to the end 
sought to be achieved by the program in question. In this regard, American courts have generally construed  that 
the manner in which a program operates, controls and regulates the computer in receiving, assembling, calculating, 
retaining, correlating, and producing useful information either on a screen, print-out or by audio communication 
would constitute the expression of the idea. The idea on the other hand would be constituted by the purpose for 
which the program was created. Consider for instance a program that was constructed by one company and sold to 
another for the purpose of effectively managing a laboratory by simplifying data management of chemicals in 
medium sized business computers. The second company however through their own efforts makes the program 
compatible with personal computers as well. Going by the decision of the U.S courts, the idea behind the program 
would be the efficient management of the laboratory and thus, only by applying the principle, this idea could be 
used by software developers from the second company. Thus in this instance, modifying the program to make it 
compatible with personal computers would amount to tampering with the expression of the idea by the first 
company and would amount to a violation of copyright.  
 
2.3 Case Laws Concerning the Idea-Expression Dichotomy: 
 
This principle followed in the United States has elicited a mixed response from courts and academics. As the 
courts have attempted to diversify the concept of an idea under copyright law, several authors have criticized the 
underlying assumption that a computer program has only one underlying idea, which is equated to the end goal or 
motive sought to be achieved by the designers. Once this idea has been identified, it must be separated from 
everything else, which is then classified as expression. The criticism takes into consideration the fact that the 
composition of a computer program involves many sub-processes/programs, which work in unison to generate the 
ultimate goal. It is stated that such sub-programs may involve ideas or goals of their own which may be entirely 
different from the overall idea intended by the designers thereby rendering the court’s classification inadequate. 
This principle was however somewhat widened in the case of Computer Associates International Inc. v. 
Altai Inc where the plaintiff, Computer Associates International (CAI) brought an action alleging that the 
defendant Altai, Inc. had utilised substantial portions of Computer Associates’ program while developing Altai's 
own computer software programs. In deciding whether the defendant Altai was liable for copyright infringement 
in developing his program and misappropriating the trade secrets of the plaintiff, the U.S Circuit court relied upon 
a three-step test called the abstraction, filtration and comparison test to determine the scope of the idea/expression 
dichotomy in the case. The procedure involved was to break down the allegedly infringed program into its 
constituent structural parts and examine each of these parts for such things as incorporated ideas, expression that is 
necessarily incidental to those ideas, and elements that are taken from the public domain, thereby sifting out all 
non-protectable material. The main aim of this was to draw on familiar copyright doctrines as merger, scenes a 
faire, and public domain and as a result giving due cognizance to the fact that computer technology is a dynamic 
field which can quickly outpace judicial decision-making. 9 
 
Step 1: Abstraction 
Abstractions constitute the first step to determine substantial similarity. Initially, a court should dismantle the 
allegedly copied program’s structure and isolate each level of abstraction contained within it. This process begins 
with the code and ends with an explanation of the program’s ultimate function. Along the way, it is necessary 
essentially to retrace and map each of the designer’s steps-in the opposite order in which they were taken during 
the program’s creation.  At a higher level of abstraction, the instructions in the lowest-level modules may be 
replaced conceptually by the functions of those modules. At progressively higher levels of abstraction, the 
functions of higher-level modules conceptually replace the implementations of those modules in terms of lower-
level modules and instructions, until only the ultimate function of the program is left. A program has structure at 
every level of abstraction at which it is viewed. At low levels of abstraction, a program’s structure may be quite 
complex; at the highest level it is trivial.   
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Step 2: Filtration  
Filtration commences after abstraction and examines the structural components at each level of abstraction to 
determine whether their particular inclusion at that level was necessarily incidental to an idea. These are called 
considerations of efficiency and functions on the principle that the more efficient a set of modules is, the more 
closely they approximate the idea or process embodied in that particular aspect of the program’s structure. If two 
programs have the same efficiency components, no copyright persists for either program.  Furthermore, filtration 
also determines whether they are required by factors external to the program itself such as computer specifications, 
program compatibility, design standards set by manufacturers and demands of the industry etc. Programs, which 
are similar on account of such procedure, would be denied copyrights and whether they are taken from the public 
domain and hence constitute non-protectable expressions, thus determining the scope of plaintiff’s copyright.   
 
Step 3: Comparison 
After the first two steps for the test for substantial similarity are completed and all elements of the allegedly 
infringed program, which are ideas or are dictated by efficiency or external factors, or taken from the public 
domain, have been sifted out, what would remain would essentially constitute the copyrightable part of the 
computer program.  
 
The Altai judgment as regards the diversification of the idea/expression dichotomy has been held to be 
good law as far as the United States is concerned. The court gave a detailed description of a process, which could 
possibly be most accurate while imposing a partition between the idea and an expression in a particular work. 
Subsequently, the First Circuit Court came up with a decision in the case of Lotus Development Corporation v. 
Borland International Inc., 10  which stated that a method of operation, as defined under 17 U.S.C. S 102(b), is a 
means by which a person operates something, whether it is a car, a food processor, or a computer, and is un-
copyrightable. Computer programs using a method of operation cannot operate without a specific command. The 
court reasoned that while identifying the non-literal elements of a computer program, one must first identify 
whether such elements fall under the criteria of a method of operation. If such non-literal elements constitute a 
method of operation, they are un-copyrightable under section 17 U.S.C. S 102(b) and therefore, an idea/expression 
dichotomy analysis need not be performed. The Court in the Lotus case acknowledged that the abstraction, 
filtration and comparison test was an effective means of identifying copyrightable elements in a computer 
program, but was ineffective in resolving an issue where factual copying of the program was admitted by a 
contesting party. The decision in the Altai case was read along with the decision of the Federal Supreme Court in 
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone. Service. Co.11 stating that, only original expressions of authors would 
be given copyright protection and that authors were encouraged to freely build on ideas and information conveyed 
by a work. 12 Recently, the U.S take on the Idea-Expression dichotomy has been partly rejected by courts in the 
United Kingdom. Decisions of the Chancery Division have outlined a slightly modified version of the dichotomy. 
This will be dealt with in the chapters to follow. 
 
3.  The Law in the United Kingdom 
 
The Law is divided into two stages – (i) Before 1911 and (ii) After 1911 when the Copyrights Act was passed. 
Before 1911, Courts adopted the principle that an idea is not subject to copyright protection and that it is only the 
expressed form of such idea that is subject to such protection. Case law indicates the reasoning adopted by English 
Courts.13 The task of the Court is to apply the contents of the Act while determining a violation of a copyright and 
the Act does not mention or take into account the existence of an idea/expression dichotomy. 14 The Act stipulates 
the content that is protected as an original work and that such work may be infringed by the taking of a substantial 
part. Thus in dealing with the question of copying, the principle is well established that there is no copyright in 
mere ideas, concepts, schemes, systems or methods. 15 Therefore the scope of copyright is limited to the protection 
of a particular form of expression of conveyance. If such copying persists, the copyright is infringed. 16 Therefore 
it is submitted that a defendant is not liable if he has adopted the idea and has made use of it in such a way desired 
by him, howsoever original it may be. Examples in this regard would be the absence of infringement of the 
copyright in a literary, dramatic or artistic work by adopting the basic idea underlying such work. 17 Thus far, the 
principle of idea/expression dichotomy would appear to be identical to that of United States law, but there is a 
subtle difference in the manner by which UK Courts have diversified the concept.  
After 1911, Courts have declared that ideas, thoughts and plans existing in a man’s brain are not ‘works’ as 
defined by the Copyright Act. 18  But once reduced into writing or other material, such ideas through their material 
form, may be susceptible to copyright protection. Given the existence of a good copyright in a work, a general idea 
underlying such copyright is not subject to protection. However a more detailed proposition or a collection of 
ideas, pattern of incidents, or a compilation of information from the original document/material form may amount 
to be a substantial portion of such work, the adoption of which may constitute a copyright violation. There exists a 
substantial body of modern case law indicating that even an expression of an idea itself does not remain 
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unprotected. Similarly case law indicates that even sole and inseparable methods of expression can be subject to 
copyright. 
Copyright law for Computer Programs in the United Kingdom is no longer confined to the rules imposed 
by the Copyrights, Patents and Designs Act, 1988. After 1991 there are three legislations, which are consulted 
simultaneously to derive the rules and regulations governing copyright of computer programs in the U.K. They 
are, The Copyrights, Patents and Designs Act, 1988, the European Council directive of 14 May 1991 on the Legal 
Protection of Computer Programs, and the Copyright (Computer Programs) Regulations, 1992. The 1992 
Regulations were enacted for the purpose of implementing the 1991 Directive into the 1988 Act, as the provisions 
of the directive are not self-executing. Furthermore, United Kingdom, being a dualist nation makes it mandatory 
for the Parliament to enact legislation in order to recognize implement an international convention as applicable 
law. Therefore all three legislations are read together and applied by Courts to factual situations. Computer 
programs are read as original literary works by the 1988 Act under section 3(1).  
Thus, Courts have determined the correct procedure that is followed while deciding cases involving the 
idea/expression dichotomy. Although a general idea cannot be copyrighted, instances where the labour involved in 
expressing such an idea in detail in the form of drawings, writing etc have been adopted, are held to be cases of 
copyright infringement. Such cases involve the copying of the detailed expression of the idea and not the idea 
itself. 19 The originality that is required, and through it the protection conferred are related directly to the 
expression of thought involved in creating the work. This principle has been applied and affirmed by a plethora of 
decisions that have applied it specifically in relation to the facts involved. 20 
 
3.1 Case Laws in the United Kingdom Concerning the Idea-Expression Dichotomy 
 
The principle applied by the Court Ibcos Computers Ltd v. Barclays Finance Ltd is an ideal example of the 
variance between the law applied in the UK and the USA. The case concerned an issue of Copyright violation 
alleging that the impugned program was identical to the original program as they were both developed and written 
by the Same Developer in spite of an undertaking taken by the developer not to design or sell similar software 
upon his resignation from the appellant’s company.  
The Court in Ibcos proposed to examine the case by determining logically the claim in copyright calls to be 
tested. For this purpose the Court had to consider whether the software in question contained the element of 
originality. While considering the idea/expression dichotomy issue that arose in connection with the whole 
package being a copyright compilation (i.e. the question of originality), the Court disagreed with a former ruling 
which held that an only method of expressing an idea is not the subject of copyright. The Court stated that it was 
of course true that a copyright cannot protect any sort of general principle, but it can protect a detailed literary or 
artistic expression. The Court cited the case of British Leyland v. Armstrong 21 where in the case of an exhaust 
pipe it was said that the copyright was protecting the engineering principles which went into its design apart from 
the existing copyrights in the drawing and that a copy of the drawing via the medium of an exhaust pipe made 
from it amounted to an infringement of such copyright. This was so even though there was also a copying of the 
engineering principles that went into the original design. 
The Court said that where an idea was sufficiently general, then even if an original work embodied it, the 
mere taking of that idea would not infringe a copyright. But if the idea were to be detailed, then there is a 
possibility of infringement, the determination of which remained a question of degree. This principle applied 
whether the work was functional or not, and whether visual or literary. Citing an example of a literary work the 
Court stated that the taking of a plot (the idea) of a novel or play could certainly infringe a copyright if that plot 
was a substantial part of the work. The Court acknowledged the statement of Judge Learned Hand who said that 
nobody has ever been able to fix a boundary between idea and expression and that the task is a difficult one. 22 
However that Court did not ignore the utility of the idea/expression dichotomy and its application in the United 
States, stating that if the defendant has merely copied a general idea then it is immaterial whether there is 
copyright in the plaintiff's work. Thus the Court stated that the principle of law applied in the United States was 
different to that applied in the United Kingdom and this difference was particularly visible in relation to copyright 
works concerned with functionality and of compilations. Thus, the Court found it appropriate to examine the 
structure of the computer program as a whole in light of it being a copyright work in addition to the literal bits of 
code and the program structure within the program. The Court stated that as the component programs and structure 
are individually subject to copyright as sufficient skill, effort and judgement went into their design. 
The ruling in Ibcos turned out to be a landmark judgement under United Kingdom Copyright law. Not only 
did the Court classify and explain in a lucid manner, the extent of applicability of the idea/expression dichotomy in 
U.K. law, it also contradicted and set right a number of judicial decisions (predominantly citing United States law 
as an example) which proposed theories contrary to the Courts ruling in the present case. 23 This judgement was 
cited in the case of Navitaire Inc. v. Easyjet Airline Company. The case was a claim for the violation of a 
copyright in a computer program by alleging that the Defendant’s online ticketing program was indistinguishable 
from the Plaintiff’s, in respect of its user interface. The Plaintiffs also claimed that that the copyright in their 
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program had been infringed by, among other things, non textual copying. They submitted that (1) each of the 
commands was a copyright work in its own right, or, alternatively, each of the complex commands was a work in 
its own right; (2) the collection of commands as a whole was entitled to copyright as a compilation; (3) in respect 
of certain screen displays, the template was a copyright work for each display; (4) presentations of the data in the 
database, so called reports, had been copied by the defendants and (5) there was non textual copying of the whole 
of the source code, which was strictly analogous to taking the plot of a book. 24 
The Court determined that the issue addressing the idea-expression dichotomy was the ‘compilation’ of the 
collection of commands that went into creating the program and the issue concerning ‘non-textual copying’. The 
Court stated that such a compilation would be entitled to copyright and cited case law substantiating the same. The 
Court drew a distinction between the provisions of Kalamazoo (Aust.) Pty v. Compact Business Systems Ltd 25and 
Baker v. Selden. 26 The former stated that a collection of accounting forms formed a compilation and each 
collection or group of forms, designed to be used with each other, was entitled to protection as a compilation of the 
constituent forms even though the constituent forms were not wholly literary whereas in Baker, the Court held that 
a collection of blank forms were not subject to copyright. At this juncture the Court in the instant case pointed out 
the essential difference between U.S and English law on the matter which rendered Baker inapplicable in this case. 
Although the Court subsequently concluded that the collection of commands in the program was not to be granted 
copyright on the basis of it being a compilation as there was no pre-existing material to form the subject matter of 
a compilation, and no compiler in the case at hand, due regard was paid to the distinction in law. 
The issue concerning ‘non-textual copying’ was one wherein the claimant was alleging an appropriation of 
the end result and business logic (overall functionality, from a business perspective) of the software. Therefore the 
issue of idea/expression cropped up because in order to arrive at a finding of infringement, something that is not 
merely inherent in the nature of the business function to be performed by the software must be taken by the 
defendants. This may not only represent the skill and labour of the designers and programmers but go wider than 
the details of the command set and the screen displays. In this regard the Court held that every element in the 
expression of an artistic work (unless it got there by accident or compulsion) constituted the expression of an idea 
on the part of the author. It was further held that, the expression of such ideas was protected as a whole and also to 
the extent to which they form a substantial part of the work. The phrase ‘substantial part’ is indicative of a 
qualitative analysis of the work rather than a quantitative analysis. As a result, the part which is regarded as 
substantial can be a feature or combination of features of the work, abstracted from it rather than forming a 
discrete part. The Court cited the example of how the original elements in the plot of a play or novel may be a 
substantial part, so that copyright may be infringed by a work which does not reproduce a single sentence of the 
original. 
Thus, where certain ideas expressed by a copyright work are not original, they are not entitled to copyright 
protection as the borrowing of such idea would not constitute the taking of a substantial part of the work (thus 
varying from the U.S position). Furthermore, the skill and labour that is appropriated must be relevant to the cause. 
A mere envisaging of an idea similar to the object sought to be achieved by the computer program, does not 
amount to the appropriation of the skill and labour necessary to constitute infringement. Therefore, in spite of the 
fact that the claim for non-textual copyright failed, due regard was given to the distinction between U.S and U.K 
law as regards the idea/expression dichotomy without prejudice to the utility of either system. 
 
4. The Law in India 
 
The law concerning copyrights in India has been substantively dealt with under the Copyrights Act 1957. Section 
16 of the said Act clearly states that a person shall not be entitled to any form of copyright otherwise than a right 
in accordance with the provisions of this Act or any other law for the time being in force. Section 13 of the Act 
defines the scope of existence of copyrights by stating exactly for what a copyright is available while Section 14 
defines the meaning of a copyright. Section 44 provides for the registration of copyrights with the registrar of 
copyrights in India though there is no provision that makes registration compulsory. The Act also deals 
extensively with what exactly amounts to a breach of copyright in Section 51 and has defined a computer program 
to come within the ambit of a literary work. Though the Act may seem exhaustive, the Act fails to define either an 
idea or an expression and any difference in the treatment of the two while there has also been a relative dearth of 
case-law concerning the idea-expression dichotomy. 
In R.G.Anand v. Deluxe Films, 27 which is the only Supreme Court decision concerning the issue of the 
dichotomy between idea and expression, a careful reading of the judgement given by a three-judge bench shows an 
inclination to the American law because they do not even consider a contingency where it is impossible to 
delineate between an idea and its expression. Then again, one cannot really say that the Supreme Court has 
preferred the American approach to the English one for the simple reason that it appears the Supreme Court has 
failed to appreciate the fact that English and American laws are different. In this case, the plaintiff who was a part-
time playwright and producer of stage plays alleged that the defendant, who was a film-maker had copied 
substantial portions from his play that had been enacted in Delhi in 1953 and had remade it into a film very shortly 
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afterwards and alleged a violation of his copyright. The respondent denied this allegation arguing instead that the 
theme of provincialism that was common to both the play and the movie was a common theme and was not an 
original idea of the plaintiff. In deciding this issue, the Supreme Court ruled that there can be no copyright in an 
idea, subject matter, themes, plots or historical or legendary facts and violation of the copyright in such cases is 
confined to the form, manner and arrangement and expression of the idea by the author of the copyright work. In 
this instant case, it was further ruled that if the defendant's work is nothing but a literal imitation of the 
copyrighted work with some variations here and there it would amount to violation of the copyright. In other 
words, in order to be actionable, the copy must be a substantial and material one which at once leads to the 
conclusion that the defendant is guilty of an act of piracy. However in this case, while comparing the play and the 
film, the Court came to the conclusion that though the theme of provincialism may have been the same, the latter 
work had been presented and treated differently and that though there were some similarities appearing in the two 
works, there were also material and broad dissimilarities which negated the intention to copy the original and the 
coincidences appearing in the two works were clearly incidental. Thus there was no infringement of a copyright in 
this case.  
 As recently as 2002, the idea/expression dichotomy issue was addressed by the Delhi Court in Anil Gupta 
v, Kunal Dasgupta 28 wherein the plaintiff had conceived of a reality matchmaking television programme and  
approached the defendant regarding the televising of the same programme. It was alleged by the plaintiff that the 
defendant had usurped his idea and implemented and claimed a breach of his copyright. The defendant argued that 
it was only the expression of the idea and not the idea itself which could be protected under the copyright. The 
Court while agreeing that an idea per se cannot be protected by a copyright also ruled that where the concept that 
has been the subject of the dispute is a novel concept, then it can be copyrighted even though it is just an idea. The 
rationale for this decision lies as the argument which was advanced by the Court that the concept developed and 
evolved by the plaintiff is the result of the work done by the plaintiff upon material which may be available for the 
use of anybody but what makes it confidential is the fact that the plaintiff has used his brain and thus produced a 
result in the shape of a concept and if defendant is allowed to show their own reality show based on the concept 
originally conceived by the plaintiff, it will be allowing the defendant to use that concept and to reap the fruit of 
the labour of the plaintiff.  
 At this juncture, it is necessary to reiterate the subtle distinctions in the law that have arisen between the 
United States and the United Kingdom and mention how and why it is of immense relevance with regard to India. 
It is unclear whether the corpus of Indian Law of Copyrights would be amenable to the concepts of functionality 
and substantial similarity while deciding the value of a copyright in a computer program, thereby subscribing to 
the procedure followed by the U.K Courts as laid down in the Ibcos and Easyjet Cases, or whether the Courts in 
India would adopt the objective test strategy adopted by the American  Courts in the Whelan Associates case and 
substantiate the proposition by using the accepted three step test given in the Altai Case. Lastly, there is also a 
substantial difference between the sources of law in the U.S.A and the U.K. The laws of copyright in the United 
States stem from Constitutional recognition whereas the principles of copyright law in the United Kingdom stem 
from the codification of Common Law principles. The general affinity of the Indian Legal system to Common 
Law principles would create a substantial debate between the applicability of U.S and U.K law in copyright cases 
within India.  
 The way the courts have approached the dichotomy in the two jurisdictions itself has been quite different. 
While it must be acknowledged that it is difficult to make out a clear-cut distinction between an idea and an 
expression, the American courts have been absolute in their decision to make ideas free from copyrights while the 
British courts on the other hand have held that where an idea is detailed to such a degree that it is impossible to 
delineate the idea from its expression, then such an idea can still be copyrighted. This distinction gains importance 
in light of the fact that there has been as yet no instance of a software programme or technology conceptualised by 
one person/company being copied by another. Though the Copyright Act does say that only the owner of a 
computer programme can have the right to adapt or translate it, what happens when another person claims to have 
developed a similar, though not identical programme on the same theme that fulfils the same objective albeit in a 
different manner? The second person can very well claim that he has not modified or adapted the formers’ work 
and that he has merely worked on the same domain as the first programmer has. So what does an Indian court do 
in such an instance? Does it follow a British Court and take the approach that the Delhi High Court has adopted 
earlier in the Anil Gupta case by delving into the extent to which the first program is innovative, novel and 
detailed so as decide whether the concept of the program itself is novel in which case the very conceptualisation of 
the programme by the first person can be copyrighted or does it follow the American approach that the purpose for 
which the programme is created is taken to be the idea and rule that there can be no copyright granted to the first 
person in this regard because his expression of his concept has not been copied (provided of course that the second 
person proves that his program is not something that he has created by tampering with the first person’s 
programme)? Under the first approach, even if it is shown that the second person has not created his programme 
by tampering with or modifying the work of another, a copyright can still be granted to the first person as long as 
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he can show that his idea is something novel and so detailed that the expression and idea cannot be separable or 
that the idea is an integral part or a substantial pert of the expression itself. 
In the R.G.Anand case that has been discussed earlier and which is to date, the only Supreme Court 
judgement concerning this particular issue, the Supreme Court has liberally cited a number of American and 
English authorities while justifying their decision. However, the Supreme Court never adverted to the fact that the 
English and American law on this subject are quite different, at the very least in theory, though this judgement 
tends to favour the English approach. The law of the land is to that extent inadequate and should have ideally 
examined both jurisdictions in isolation as was carried out in the subsequent and more contemporary Anil 
Dasgupta Decision. The outcome in R.G Anand concerned a copyright issue pertaining to the adoption of the 
theme or plot of an artistic work. Had the Supreme Court paid due regard to the differences of law in the America 
and the United Kingdom, then it is a logical conclusion that Indian law will have been able to accept the fact that 
situations will arise where the borrowing of a theme or a detailed idea may violate the copyright of the original 
author. The Court in R.G Anand has unfortunately omitted this distinction and as a result any future case 
concerning computer programs where a detailed analysis of copyrightable elements is required at every stage of 
the program’s preparation would automatically align itself under the decision in the R.G. Anand case and hence 
the pro-UK decision, which is definitely more progressive in its scope laid down in the Anil Gupta case has, as a 
result been rendered as obiter dicta.  
There will be a time in the near future when the Supreme Court will have to come to terms with this 
difference between the English and American laws and make a pronouncement regarding the same  It would be 
unwise to ignore the American law altogether as it presents an accurate method of analysing a computer program 
and breaking it down through a step by step method to obtain the copyrightable element with respect being given 
only to the original expression of the author and not to general ideas or knowledge. This minute attention to detail 
as outlined by the American courts is extremely relevant is identifying the extent to which it is possible to 
delineate an idea from an expression. Thus the American system is more liberal in allowing development in 
various fields by encouraging authors to freely use available ideas and knowledge. However the English system, 
on the other hand gives more attention to the original work of the author as a whole as against identifying 
particular elements of expression that may be copyrighted. Importance is given to the detailed application of 
general principles of knowledge applied by the author in expressing his work and as a result can be protected by a 
copyright, going by the decisions in Ibcos and Navitaire.  Indian courts have traditionally followed the latter and 
more conservative approach with regard to general copyright law and there is nothing to suggest that Indian courts 
will make an exception with regard to the idea-expression dichotomy as and when they have to deal with this 
distinction. Thus there is always a balance of interests – between the interests of the person whose ingenuity has 
created a particular idea that is novel and cannot be delineated from its expression on one hand and interests of 
society on the other, which will suffer if a copyright is granted to an idea itself, for it will discourage people other 
than the inventor himself from developing on this idea. The liberal approach is manifestly in favour of protecting 
the interests of the society at the expense of those of the inventor. So on the face of it, the traditional approach 
might seem to work against the greater good where the interests of society are sacrificed in favour of those of the 
individual inventor. However that is not the case as the liberal approach might in fact work against the greater 
good as well. This is because of the fact that by failing to grant protection to novel and innovative ideas by 
following the liberal approach, American Courts tends to discourage people from developing novel ideas. The 
interests of Society would be affected more in a scenario where a person is discouraged from developing such 
ideas than in a one wherein a novel idea has been thought of by someone and protected for a prescribed period. 
This is often the reason why Indian courts have preferred the traditional approach to the liberal one with regard to 
copyright laws in general. 
  
5. Conclusion 
 
This distinction becomes relevant in light of the Anil Gupta case where it appears that the Delhi High Court has 
followed the principles laid down by the British courts rather than those laid down by their America counterparts. 
However it appears that Indian courts have not appreciated this distinction which becomes evident when the 
Supreme Court actually cited both American and British authorities in its judgement. Given the recent stand taken 
by the Delhi High Court, one would not be too presumptuous if one were to assume that it would be the British 
law that would be of greater application in India. The entire Indian system of civil law has been given to the nation 
by the British and India has also extensively incorporated principles of common law and in fact, the original 
Copyright Act first framed in 1914 was itself a product of the British administration. Furthermore, the distinction 
between an idea per se and an idea from which the expression cannot be delineated – a distinction that has been 
ignored by American Courts – is one that is necessary as it would be manifestly inequitable in law if one person 
were allowed to use an idea or concept of another even though an idea per se cannot be copyrighted, especially in 
a case where the latter has put in considerable amount of ingenuity to add a touch of novelty to his idea. If this 
distinction were removed, then one needs to pause and consider the plight of such a person who is put in a 
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situation where he gets no reward for his ingenuity. So removing this distinction would in effect also result in 
removing incentives for creating new and novel concepts which will, in the long run, inevitably hamper the growth 
of software technology. However for the reasons that have been cited, the American law cannot be completely cast 
aside either. So it is important to analyse the pros and cons of applying either of these laws in India and as is often 
the wont when faced with choosing between two completely different viewpoints, it is best if one were to take a 
via media approach to solving this problem in the sense that we will have to work out a system where we can 
successful incorporate American law to the extent that we adopt their three step approach in analysing a computer 
program into the traditionalist English approach. 
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